We analyze a standard employee selection model given two institutional constraints: …rst, professional experience perfectly substitutes insu¢cient formal education for insiders while this substitution is imperfect for outsiders. Second, in the latter case the respective substitution rate increases with the advertised minimum educational requirement. Optimal selection implies that the expected level of formal education is higher for outsider than for insider recruits. Moreover, this di¤erence in educational attainments increases with lower optimal minimum educational job requirements. Investigating data of a large US public employer con…rms both of the above theoretical implications. Generally, the econometric model exhibits a "good …t".
Introduction
Generally, every US employer is free to employ individuals at his will. However, selection criteria must be validated and quali…cation requirements must be set reasonably to avoid disparate impact charges under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964. 1 To the extent that members of minority groups, women, or disabled individuals have been socially excluded from obtaining the respective formal education or training, such requirements can be ruled excessively restrictive -i. e. set to preclude successful applications from these groups. 2 The Civil Rights Act of 1991 has then introduced the right to a jury trial, extended the group of potential plainti¤s, and eased the use of statistical information as evidence. Moreover, by allowing for punitive damages in addition to back-pay the act has increased the potential costs per case. 3 Since such claims can concern wrongful non-hirings as well as non-promotions, this legal risk applies to all employee selection processes within …rms. 4 To reduce this risk, the Equal Employment Opportunity Commission (EEOC ) advises to phrase quali…cation requirements in terms of necessary skills and abilities rather than formal educational degrees or years of experience. 5 This advice meets with a second set of rules that is rooted in the employer's duty to provide job security and career development. 6 Fair selection standards may thus require to be alternatively phrased in terms of formal educational requirements and substitute professional experience criteria. In this respect, public sector employees are additionally covered by the Fourteenth Amendment right to Equal Protection. 7 The federal government itself has therefore committed to a set of rules laid out in the Operating Manual: Quali…cation Standards for General Schedule Positions. 8 This manual lists educational degree and equivalent professional 1 See Carlson (2005, p. 126 -132) for an account of origins and consequences of non-discrimination law and precedence court decisions concerning the employee selection process. 2 In the original case -see Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971) -the company required a highschool diploma and a certain score on a general aptitude test to qualify for internal promotion. The court found that these requirements disparately impact ethnic minority groups. Speci…cally, AfricanAmericans were less likely to hold a highschool degree and averaged lower test scores and were, therefore, selected at a much a lower rate. 3 Oyer and Schaefer (2002) . 4 See Gutman (2003 Gutman ( , 2004 for an overview of precedence cases and court decisions. 5 See section 15-IX "Proactive Prevention" EEOC (2006) . 6 Clardy (2003) . 7 See Carlson (2005, p. 753 -756) . 8 This manual is updated and published (without publication date) by the US O¢ce of Personnel Management, Washington D. C.
experience requirements for speci…ed hierarchical positions. 9 Following the legislative development, the disparate impact issue has received repeated attention by economists. 10 Yet, based on models of statistical discrimination, such analyses are mostly con…ned to addressing the e¤ects across groups that are protected under this legislation. Nevertheless, Oyer and Schaefer (2002) already show that the distributional consequences of the Civil Rights Act of 1991 are signi…cant since population groups di¤er in their propensities to sue. However, given the above, the legal risk is job-speci…c as well. Thus, setting quali…cation requirements in recruitment processes is subject to a twofold set of constraints: the standards themselves must be reasonable such as not to exclude quali…ed individuals. Moreover, professional experience gained in similar -typically, re ‡ecting career tracks, hierarchically inferior -positions within the …rm can substitute for a lack of formal education.
Organizational and assessment psychology assumes that the human resources department maximizes the expected on-the-job ability of the group of recruits. Our theoretical model developed below then augments the standard textbook "utility analysis" 11 of personnel selection to include three predictors: educational attainment, professional experience, and test scores. Speci…cally, we assume that the …rm perfectly substitutes professional experience for formal education when dealing with applications of current employees while this substitution is less than perfect for applicants from outside the …rm. However, due to increased legal risk, the respective substitution rate applied to outsider applications increases with higher minimum educational requirements.
Of course, with informative signals the probability of being hired monotonically increases in all three signal values. However, given the constraints above, the expected educational attainment of outsider recruits exceeds that of current employees. Further, the wedge between the two groups' expected educational levels widens as minimum educational requirements are decreased. We further subject this selection model to empirical testing using a data set supplied by a large US public employer. The data allows to control for a number of characteristics that are speci…c to a particular job- 9 The New York State Department of Civil Services' view of Knowledge-Skill-Ability-Based Minimum Quali…cations -see Martin (2005) -provides an interesting second example since it sets out to de…ne an "equivalence equation" to compute substitute professional experience requirements.
1 0 Respective contributions to annual meetings of the American Economic Association include Welch (1981), Ashenfelter and Oaxaca (1987) , Abram (1993) , Coates and Loury (1993), and Betsey (1994) . 1 1 Holling (1998) provides a survey of model structures. Schmidt and Hunter (1998) discuss the origins and development of this approach.
opening, selection process, and individual applicant. The empirical analysis supports our theoretical implications.
Since the seminal work of Freeman (1976) and Duncan and Ho¤man (1981) , numerous empirical studies for almost all developed economies have reported that overeducation increases wages and employment probabilities. Also, this e¤ect is stronger for jobs that require unskilled or lower-skilled labor than for skilled jobs. 12 However, the explanations o¤ered are mostly labor-market oriented. 13 The career mobility approach developed by Sicherman and Galor (1990) constitutes the notable exception: responding to their …rm's human resources development strategy, individuals enhance their career progress by accepting "underquali…ed work" in early career stages. To our knowledge, only Groeneveld and Hartog (2004) have so far provided an empirical test: investigating jobs sheltered within a protected internal labor market, they conclude that the overeducation e¤ect on wages re ‡ects such strategic behavior.
The contribution of our analysis is then threefold: …rst, we empirically con…rm the existence of an overeducation e¤ect on hiring probabilities. However, this e¤ect is con…ned to outsider recruits. Thus, we also …nd evidence that the career mobility argument does not apply to our …rm. Second, we therefore provide a simple but novel theoretical model to show that this selection behavior may rather be induced by institutional constraints. Since these constraints restrict the use of informative signals, the …rm's outsider recruits are only seemingly overquali…ed -i.e. without the constraints the …rm would have actually advertised higher standards. Hence, third and adding to the debate on the e¤ects of hiring quotas derived from models of statistical discrimination, our arguments highlight the informational ine¢ciency induced by the threat of disparate impact charges.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows: the next section informs about the selection process as it has been described in interviews with the …rm's human resources department. Given this description, we develop the theoretical model and derive testable hypotheses. Section 3 then provides a description of the data, develops the econometric approach, and reports our empirical …ndings. The paper concludes with a summary and discussion -the latter also addressing new regulations currently emerging 1 2 See Groot and Maasen van den Brink (2000) . 1 3 Hence, emphasizing ine¢cient investment in ability signals, arguments derived from Spence's (1973) theory of labor market signaling and Thurow's (1975) theory of job competition compete with Sattinger's (1993) assignment theory. See, for instance, Hartog (2000) , Bauer (2002), and Chevalier (2003) for literature surveys and respective applications.
in the European educational systems.
2 The theoretic approach
Description of the institutional setting
We adapt the standard recruitment model by introducing speci…c assumptions concerning the sequential structure of the selection process and the binding or non-binding nature of minimum quali…cation requirements. These assumptions are derived from qualitative interviews with executive managers of the human resource department of the …rm supplying its data for the empirical analysis to follow. This process is best described as a step-wise procedure. It begins when the …rm's responsible …nancial executive o¢cer (FEO) agrees to a job opening demanded by the department of employment (DoE ). In a …rst step, the human resources department (HR) and DoE must then agree on the classi…cation of the job in terms of the bundle of tasks expected to be carried out, its hierarchical and organizational imbeddedness, and the minimum educational and professional experience requirements. This agreement determines a salary range that can later only be stretched by special consent of the FEO. HR considers the …rm -by far being the largest employer in the region -to possess monopsony power. In fact, revisions of the salary range by FEO constitute very rare exceptions. Generally, the …rm's salary ranges are su¢ciently attractive for applicants.
In a second step, HR advertises the job openings publicly -i.e. by postings and departmental mail within the …rm, via newspaper ads, and on the internet. Jobs of the same classi…cation while allocated to di¤erent DoE s are advertised jointly. Hence, typically a recruitment process aims at hiring a group of applicants. The advertisements communicate the job classi…cation, salary ranges, and the minimum educational and professional requirements. Subsequently, HR receives applications from within and outside the …rm which contain veri…able documents concerning educational attainments and professional experiences. HR reserves the right to reject applications for formal reasons -i.e. if the professional quali…cation of the candidate is obviously inadequate.
HR is mainly concerned with minimizing the legal costs associated with potential discrimination charges brought against the …rm by unsuccessful applicants. Speci…cally, our …rm being a public employer observes that screening applications on grounds of formal education bears the risk of disparate impact charges. Although the …rm encourages its employees to enroll in further education programs and obtain formal degrees, it also accepts that professional experience can substitute for lacking educational degrees. Given the argument that educational standards may conceal discriminatory practises, the rate of substitution is perceived as increasing with minimum educational requirements. 14 Taken to its theoretic extreme, we assume that applicants who can document that the sum of their educational and professional achievements exceeds the sum of the respective two minimum requirements cannot be screened out. In principle, this rule applies to all applications. However, since job requirements and their corresponding descriptions always contain some …rm-speci…c elements, the legal risk of screening is lower when dealing with applications from outside the …rm. Theoretically, we assume that the professional experience claimed by outsiders is discounted when checking whether an application meets the minimum requirements. 15 The above then implies that the respective discount factor increases in the advertised minimum educational standard.
In the third step of the recruitment process, all applicants who, given the di¤erence in screening insiders and outsiders, pass the respective selection criteria are then pooled and subjected to the same set of job-speci…c ability tests. These tests always include job interviews with and formally evaluated by DoE. Conditional on the job type, other tests of cognitive abilities and/or non-cognitive skills may be added. Appreciating the results of these tests, DoE makes its hiring choices to be implemented by HR. However, before negotiations with the successful applicants begin, HR carries out a rationality check of DoE 's choices. As emphasized in our interviews, HR ensures that test standards have not been (re-)de…ned to meet a speci…c applicant's pro…le.
Summarizing, two veri…able signals -educational degree and professional experience -are available for screening applicants to be passed on to testing. However, only the sum of the two with professional experience discounted in outsider applications must meet the cut-o¤ criterion. Testing then constitutes a costly activity which generates yet 1 4 To put it more blankly, if a gardener's job would be advertised to require a PhD in botanics, every less educated member of a socially disadvantaged group who could prove to have experience in lawn mowing could successfully claim to have been discriminated. 1 5 Hence, a top executive's secretary may be required to possess a BA-degree. However, since this requirement does not apply to secretary positions in general, internal candidates on a career track cannot be excluded. In contrast, outsiders can be screened out by claiming that the position requires …rm-speci…c knowledge. Hence, their professional experience is "discounted". a third signal.
The model 2.2.1 Basic assumptions and notations
Given the above, let on-the-job ability a be identically and independently distributed N ( ; 2 a ) over the two populations of applicants denoted insiders and outsiders. Further, the degree of formal schooling s, professional experience x, and potential test scores z are known to be identically, independently, and standard normally distributed over these two populations. As usual, (y) and (y), y 2 fs; x; zg, denote the standard normal distribution and density functions.
HR has carried out pre-tests to validate that
where " N (0; 2 " ) is a measurement error with Cov("; y) = 0 for y 2 fs; x; zg. Realistically, the predictors are correlated. For instance, holding age constant, the duration of formal education and professional experience should be negatively correlated. 16 However, assuming stochastic independence between signals serves to identify the economic mechanisms driving the outcome of this process of screening and testing. Hence, we assume that Cov(s; x) = Cov(s; z) = Cov(x; z) = 0.
Let r ay 0 denote the coe¢cient of correlation between ability and the predictor y, y 2 fs; x; zg. Then, = and y = ray a y . To (signi…cantly) economize on space and notation, we assume that r ax = r as = in the following. 17 Further simplifying notations, let r az = r. Now, suppose that HR requires minimum educational quali…cation S and professional experience X to select an applicant for testing. Let ! I s+x and S +X. Note that ! I N (0; 2) and denote the respective distribution and density functions by I (! I ) and I (! I ). Also, all applicants whose test score satis…es z Z will actually be hired. Given the institutional constraints described above, the expected ability of insider recruits can then be derived as
For outsiders let 2 (0; 1) denote the "discount" factor measuring the fraction of an outsider's documented professional experience that quali…es for the job opening. 18 To focus on the informational aspects of the screening process, we assume that this "discounting" of an outsider's professional experience only a¤ects the possibility to enforce the screening criteria S and X. As discussed above, we speci…cally assume that = (S), with 0 (S) > 0 and lim S!1 (S) = 1. Thus, as HR raises the minimum educational requirement, an outsider's professional experience must increasingly be accepted as a substitute for (lack of) formal education.
2 ). Then, denote the respective distribution and density functions by O (! O ; (S)) and O (! O ; (S)). Hence, the expected ability of outsider recruits can be obtained as
Obviously, the above calculations of expected abilities demand that both groups of applicants are su¢ciently large. For simplicity, we further assume that they are of identical size N . Given that there are M openings, the recruitment process must then ensure that
where M N < 1. The …rm's objective, implemented by HR, is to maximize the expected ability E F fa; S; X; Zg =
of its new recruits net of the costs C associated with the ability tests. Following the literature on testing for recruitment, these costs are …xed and re ‡ect HR's choice of the test design. Obviously, no such costs must be incurred if the recruitment decisions are based only on the educational and professional information supplied by the applicants themselves.
Screening and testing with only one group of applicants
Focussing on selecting recruits from only one group of applicants serves best to illustrate the economic mechanism governing this particular recruitment process. Hence, to begin with, we assume that there are only internal applications and set O ( ) = 1 in (5) and (4) above. The respective Lagrange-function can be derived as
where
denotes an indicator function that captures the opportunity cost nature of C.
The …rst-order conditions can be rearranged to yield:
Y 2 fS; Xg :
These conditions immediately reveal two important properties. First, according to (9), HR will never set separate educational and professional minimum requirements if applications can only come from within the …rm. Second, only if HR decides on additional testing, an optimum recruitment policy may be characterized by balancing the marginal returns from setting application and testing standards. Otherwise, expected ability is simply determined by choosing such as to satisfy (4) for (Z) = 0.
Investigating (8) then reveals
where e is de…ned by 1
Accounting for (4) given the above assumption that O = 1, lim Z ! 1 E I = C < 0. Additional testing can thus be optimal if the respective costs are low. Also, the coe¢cient of correlation r between ability and the test score should be large relative to , the latter re ‡ecting the correlation between ability and the signal content of the application documents.
Job interviews are likely to qualify in this respect. 19 For the remainder, we will therefore assume such an interior solution. In the present case, it implies
As expected, the testing costs induce a distortion: selection according to test scores is "over-restrictive". (5) and (4) then allows to characterize the alternative scenario of hiring only from a pool of outsiders. Only switching superscripts, the …rst-order conditions with respect to (Z) and Z restate (8) and (10) from above. Yet, (9) is replaced by,
where we have made use of the properties of the normal distribution to obtain (14).
Taking the limits S ! 1 of the RHS of (13) and (14), this corner solution violates (4) since all applicants would be screened out. Further, taking the respective limits S ! 1 implies that the expected signal values are zero. Hence, the applicants' documents would not be used for screening at all. However, since this information is costless for the …rm, this corner solution can also be ruled out. Again, an interior solution is ensured if it is optimal to test the applicants. The preceding arguments then imply that this solution must be characterized by 0 < (S) < 1.
Comparing (13) and (14) with (9) reveals that the interior solution implies distinctly separate minimum educational and professional experience requirements in the outsiderrecruitment case. From a purely informational economics perspective, "discounting" the professional experience of outsiders increases the precision of the signal ! O which is subjected to the cut-o¤ criterion .
Two e¤ects then determine an optimal increase in precision. First, as (S) decreases, the two signals x and s contained in ! O can increasingly be used separately to predict on-the-job ability. Yet, the positive e¤ect of this signal separation on the precision of ! O is traded-o¤ against the fact that professional experience also receives less weight as a predictor of ability. In the extreme, for (S) = 0, experience is not used for screening at all.
Recruiting from two independent pools of insiders and outsiders
Given the description of the institutional setting with mandatory public job advertisements, HR organizes the recruitment process to maximize (5) subject to (4). Yet, characterizing the solution does not add further analytic insights. The respective …rst-order conditions with respect to the minimum educational and professional experience requirements, S and X, merely contain weighted sums of the terms in (13), (14), and (9). The weights are given by
Hence, the characterizations above carry over in the sense that, if -given the costs of testing -the test scores are used for selection, the solution balances the marginal returns from using all three signals for recruitment. Separate educational and professional experience standards will then be advertised but only enforced in screening outsider applications. These analytic conclusions imply the following hypotheses for empirical testing:
H1: Outsider recruits are characterized by higher educational levels than insider recruits.
Since insider applications resemble the current structure of educational attainments in the …rm's labor force, new employees therefore appear to be overquali…ed. However, such new recruits are only seemingly overquali…ed: suppose the threat of disparate impact charges would not constrain HR in advertising and enforcing educational requirements. Then, it would clearly require higher educational standards that would adequately account for the respective signal value. The insider-outsider di¤erence then re ‡ects that HR cannot economize on this signal value at all when dealing with the former group.
Further, recall that lower minimum educational requirements S ceteris paribus increase the possibility of "discounting" the professional experience of outsiders. 20 This policy is optimal because it increases the precision of the screening process. Since the e¤ect only applies to outsider applications, recruiting for jobs which are advertised to require rather low educational degrees result in relatively more "overquali…ed" new employees. Hence, it also follows: H2: The overquali…cation e¤ect on the group of outsider recruits increases with lower minimum educational standards set for successful applicants.
3 Empirical analysis
The data
In May 2003, the …rm -a large US public employer -introduced an online recruiting system. Starting with this date, all job applicants were required to (also) …le an electronic application and obtain log-in user-names and passwords. Hence, our data covers the time period from the introduction of this system to February 2006. During this phase HR assigned a team to provide assistance for potential applicants. The data is further restricted to rank-and-…le employee and laborer positions; recruitment processes aimed at …lling executive positions are excluded. Our data set comprises 33780 observations of individuals who (a) …led complete applications during this time-span and (b) entered a recruitment process which had reached a …nal decision by the end of our observation period. There were 1244 of such processes (see Table 1 ).
The data set contains information concerning the educational attainments of all candidates. All possible US degrees -i.e. doctorate, master, bachelor, some college education, high school degree, highschool equivalent degree (GED), and only some high school education -can be found among both the applicants and the recruits (see Table  2 ). The data further contains the applicant's work experience, age, gender, race, and the recruitment channel by which she had been attracted. Each application is linked to a job-opening for which the data set provides the expected date of commencing work, position title, DoE, and type of appointment (Job Type). The latter ranges from 1 for Contingent/On-Call Labor (no bene…ts) to 6 for Regular/Full-Time Employee (eligible for bene…ts).
Upon our request, HR also supplied the respective advertised required levels of education, the Equal Employment Opportunity (EEO) code numbers which increase in steps of 10 points from 10 (executive, administrative and managerial positions) to 70 (service and maintenance positions), the Fair Labor Standards Act status (FLSA) which takes on the value 1 if the job is exempt (no overtime pay) and zero otherwise, and the workplace scores (Grade). The latter re ‡ect the necessary skills and experience, the complexity of the tasks and creativity required in exercising them, the job's impact on the …rm's mission, exposure to internal and external contacts, the degree of discretion in decision making, physical stress, and working conditions. The weights associated with these factors are determined consensually by HR and the DoE prior to advertising the job opening. Calculated as a weighted sum of these factors, the score determines the compensation range.
De…ning overquali…cation as possessing a higher than the advertised educational degree, Table 3 reveals that the majority of the recruits -i.e. 58% -were overquali…ed, while 34% actually possessed just the minimum required educational degree (exactly Quali…ed ). If the applications were forwarded by direct contact from a DoE (DCD) or other internal reference (IR), we classify the respective applicants as insiders. They constitute 11:4% of all applicants. All other recruitment channels -i.e. initiated by webbased job posting board, the …rm's own website, newspaper advertisements (NwAd ), job notices sent to colleges or universities (JNU ) or to the state employment o¢ce (SEO), and other (ORC ) -in sum de…ne the outsider status.
Combining the …rst two of the above as web-recruitment channels (WebRc), they account for those 77% of the applications which doubtlessly come from outside the …rm (see Table 3 ). Insiders (IR&DCD) then form the largest group among recruits who are underquali…ed. In contrast, outsiders constitute the largest group among the hired overquali…ed applicants. This observation clearly suggests that insider and outsider applications receive rather di¤erent appraisals during the recruitment process.
De…nitions of variables and OLS-estimation
The dependent variable Status in the regression reported in Table 4 takes on the value 1 if the applicant is hired and zero otherwise. Characterizing the particular job opening, Grade, the EEO code number, the FLSA status variable, and Job Type serve as explanatory variables. The characteristics of the recruitment processes are captured by the total number of job-candidates (Applications) per job. In addition, the number of applications which used the same recruitment channel (Appl.'s Rc) re ‡ects the individual's competitive environment.
As explained above, an insider application is de…ned by the use of internal references. Including the recruitment channel used by a particular outsider applicant then serves to examine whether there exists a dominant form of attracting successful candidates from outside the …rm. Other variables characterizing the individual applicant are Age, Sex (equal to 1 if the applicant is male), professional Experience, and the minority status (Non-White). 21 Unfortunately, the data only allows to identify whether the individual possesses (1) or does not possess (0) adequate professional experiences as judged by HR. As usual, we also include the square of the individual's age to allow for a non-linear age-productivity pro…le.
Clearly, the variables re ‡ecting the applicant's educational background are of key interest. The variable Education ranges from 0 for completed …rst grade to 19 for a doctorate degree. This coding of educational attainments thus mirrors the individual's time spent in formal education. To capture a possible non-linear education-productivity relationship we also include the square of this variable. Exact Qual takes on the value 1 if the applicant is just quali…ed relative to the advertised minimum educational level. We similarly construct Over Qual and Less Qual to denote the over and less quali…ed applicants, respectively. To avoid multicollinearity problems, we exclude Over Qual from the regressions. According to our theoretical model, the insider e¤ect on the hiring probability manifests in professional experience substituting for a lack of formal education. Thus, we include the respective interaction variables Exp Ins. and Educ Ins. between Experience and Education and the insider status. Table 4 shows the results from performing a simple OLS regression. The probability to be recruited is lower for non-whites and older applicants where the latter e¤ect appears to level out. Higher hiring probabilities for women likely re ‡ect the overall dominance of administrative jobs in the sample. The negative sign for Job Type also meets our expectations since the value of this variable decreases with more attractive hierarchical positions. More competition for the job -as measured by Applications and Applicant's Rc -decreases the probability to be hired. Among the recruitment channels for outsiders, web-based applications exhibit a strong positive impact, while being sent by the state employment agency decreases the hiring probability. Clearly, the former signals more and the latter less intense private e¤orts in …nding a job.
Focussing on the key quali…cation variables, both better education and professional experience obviously increase the probability to be hired. Further, the e¤ects of higher formal education are even stronger for insiders. Moreover, both Exact Qual and Less Qual are positive and highly signi…cant. On …rst sight, being overquali…ed therefore does not appear to yield higher success probabilities. However, recall from the description of the institutional setting that HR and DoE agree on the speci…cation of the job opening in the …rst step of the recruitment process. This speci…cation is used to calculate the workplace score (Grade) and is publicly advertised. While HR strictly oversees that the job speci…cations are not revised during the selection process, expectations concerning the relative scarcity of quali…ed applicants may nevertheless a¤ect DoE 's e¤orts to negotiate a higher score.
Since a higher score implies a more generous salary range, there may therefore exist a second indirect e¤ect of the applicants' quali…cation structure on the hiring probability. Speci…cally, the process of obtaining the workplace score may have induced an endogeneity problem. Moreover, following Wooldridge (2002, p. 604) , our estimates will be unbiased, consistent, and asymptotically normal only if the decision to apply is random across the two groups. However, recall that entering an application requires the ability to use a computer and to set up an online account -both likely to be correlated with the individual's educational status. Hence, HR's on-site assistance in …ling the online application may have induced a selection problem by encouraging relatively more applications by less quali…ed insiders.
The IV-regression
Both the endogeneity and the selection problems discussed above warrant the use of instrumental variables. Hence, we instrument Grade to account for the endogeneity of the job speci…cation mechanism. Our interviews suggest that the three DoE -types within the …rm (i.e., central administration, DoE sta¤ positions, and technical support and services), face di¤erent labor market characteristics and, consequently, determine workplace scores such as to generate attractive salary ranges. Consequently, the department-types qualify as adequate instruments. To avoid multicollinearity, technical support and services constitutes a benchmark department-type.
Furthermore, the number of applications by individuals who possess a higher than the minimum required educational degree -denoted Overquali…ed -proxies the …rm's expectation concerning the scarcity of the respective personnel. Given the above, the decision to …le an application should be a function of the recruiting channel re ‡ecting an applicant's access to on-site assistance. Conditional on this covariate, the participation decisions should be independent between the two groups. Controlling for the recruiting channel in a Two-Stage Least Squares (2SLS ) approach then appears su¢cient to overcome this problem.
First, we perform the Hausman test for endogeneity to address the quality of our arguments above. Following Wooldridge (2002, p. 361 and p. 471), we insert the predicted residuals from the reduced form into the main regression equation and test whether the respective coe¢cient is statistically di¤erent from zero. We implement Murphy and Topel's (2002) approach to correct the standard errors and report the results for the linear probability model (LPM ) in Table 5 . The respective F -statistic attains the value 17:13. Thus, we strongly reject the null of no endogeneity. This result generally con…rms the adequacy of the 2SLS -approach to capture the speci…c features of the …rm's recruitment process.
Further, note that in the reduced form (i.e. the left column of Table 5 ) the coe¢cient on the number of overquali…ed applicants is positive and highly signi…cant. This …nding con…rms that HR and DoE agree on higher workplace scores when they expect more highly quali…ed job candidates. 22 However, to achieve a correct inference in the 2SLS framework, we check the correlation between the endogenous variable and the instruments. The F -test for the null-hypothesis on the coe¢cients of Central Dept, DoE Dept, and Overquali…ed reveals a value of 376.92. Since this statistic follows a 2 -distribution with three degrees of freedom, the null hypothesis is strongly rejected. 23 Given a partial R 2 of 0:7183 of the …rst-stage regression and the F -statistic above, we conclude that our instruments are strong predictors of the endogenous variable. 24 Comparing the partial e¤ects of our 2SLS-LPM model (Table 5 ) with those derived using OLS (Table 4 ) and logit and probit (Table 6 ) reveals only small di¤erences. 25 With the exception of Grade that is instrumented, all other coe¢cients of the 2SLS regression 2 2 Within our sample, Grade varies in between 50 and 65.Hence, one more overquali…ed applicant per job increases this score by 0:002 points.
2 3 Following Staiger and Stock (1997) , the respective F -statistic should be greater than 10:83: 2 4 Baker et al. (1995) . Also, we have experimented with other potential instruments and performed overidenti…cation tests. However, the respective Lagrange Multiplier tests did not support the inclusion of any other instrument. 2 5 We report the marginal e¤ects using both logit and probit models mainly for comparison and robustness checks. Note, however, that interaction variables cannot be interpreted in the usual way in either logit or probit models. Following Ai and Norton (2003) , the interaction e¤ect must be calculated as
preserve their signs and magnitudes. Moreover, the switch in sign for Grade does not indicate a lack of robustness. Rather, the presence of overquali…ed applicants constitutes a strong determinant of the workplace score. This argument then clearly supports the IV-approach. As before, more competition for the job -as measured by Applications and Applicant's Rc -decreases the probability to be hired. The former, however, enters via the recruiter's expectation when determining the workplace score (Grade).
Also, note that in the 2SLS regression the coe¢cient on Less Qual becomes insignificant. Hence, accounting for the endogeneity of Grade, the less-quali…ed do not exhibit higher success probabilities relative to the overquali…ed applicants anymore. Further, the marginal e¤ects after logit and probit suggest that the e¤ects of higher formal education and professional experience are even stronger for insiders. The marginal e¤ects of the interaction variables are highly signi…cant (see Figures 1 -2) . These results support our theoretical model since insiders are on average less quali…ed.
As is well known, heteroskedasticity will induce inconsistent estimators in both probit and logit regressions. However, according to Wooldridge (2005, p. 479) , this problem only a¤ects the latent model. Thus, the issue of inconsistent estimation of the slope parameters is practically irrelevant: probit may provide reasonable estimates of the partial e¤ects even though logit is the correct model. In our case, the estimated partial e¤ects are very similar for logit and probit.
Insider-outsider e¤ects on the screening mechanism
We are further interested in the validity of hypothesis H2. In a next step, we therefore de…ne dependent variables according to whether the individual is hired for a job that require a highschool diploma, a bachelor's, or a master's degree. Testing for di¤erences on the coe¢cients of Experience and Education across these three subgroups, we use a simultaneous system of equations of the Seemingly Unrelated Regression (SUR) type. 26 Given the endogeneity problem, we therefore perform a Three Stage Least Squares Regression (3SLS ).
To save space, we only report the estimates for the key variables in Table 7 . The coe¢cients on both Experience and Education are decreasing with increasing minimum educational requirements. Con…rming our former …ndings, the F -test for the null hypothesis that the coe¢cients on Education are all zero yields the value 40:51 which is signi…cantly higher than the critical value given a 2 -square distribution with two degrees of freedom. We also perform pairwise tests of equality among coe¢cients. With p-values of 0:0085 (0:0003) the null-hypotheses that the coe¢cients of Education are identical whether the …rm hires a candidate with highschool or bachelor degree (bachelor or master degree, respectively) is strongly rejected. Thus, H2 appears to be con…rmed as well.
However, focussing on Educ. Ins. there appears to be no clear pattern within the group of insiders. Thus, a third set of dependent variables distinguishes whether a recruit possesses a higher educational degree than advertised as required (OverStatus), is exactly quali…ed (ExactStatus), or underquali…ed (LessStatus). In Table 8 we again report the results only for the key coe¢cients. The highly positive and signi…cant coe¢cient of the Insiders when the dependent variable is LessStatus then implies that being an insider and underquali…ed actually increases the chances of being hired. This aligns with previous …ndings in Table 4 . More importantly, however, it clearly contradicts the validity of the career mobility approach within the current context. Finally, the top entries in Table 9 report the predicted average probabilities of being hired given that an applicant is overquali…ed, exactly quali…ed, or underquali…ed. The LPM, logit, and probit estimates are almost identical. Therefore we only use the LPMresults to derive the average hiring probabilities conditional on the advertised educational requirement for the full sample and a sample excluding all insider observations. Clearly, across all advertised degree requirements, the induced decrease in these predicted average probabilities is largest for the underquali…ed applicants. Again, this observation supports that, when competing for the same job, successful outsider recruits are characterized by higher educational attainments than insiders. Yet, the latter are generally more successful in becoming hired/promoted.
Goodness of …t
Since we are using …rm-level data, an immediate question concerns whether our empirical results are also descriptive for the HR's activities and choices. Hence, we carry out the Hosmer- Lemeshow (1982) goodness-of-…t test. We divide our sample into six subsamples to compare observed and predicted counts of outcome events. This number of subgroups corresponds to the number of di¤erent minimum levels of education advertised: jobs which require (1) the ability to read and write, (2) a highschool diploma, (3) a postsecondary (i.e. two-year college) degree, (4) a bachelor's degree, (5) a master degree, and (6) a doctorate degree.
Thus, the …rst sextile in Table 10 corresponds to the 1/6-sample of applicants who are characterized by the lowest while the sixth sextile is de…ned for the subgroup with the highest probability to be hired. The Hosmer-Lemeshow (HL) statistic is then computed as
If the null hypothesis of a "good …t" is true, this statistic is distributed 2 with four degrees of freedom. Columns OBS_1 and EXP_1 in Table 10 list the observed and predicted hiring cases while columns OBS_0 and EXP_0 contain the observed and predicted non-hiring cases. The overall value of HL can be calculated as 4:77 implying that the null hypothesis of a "good …t" cannot be rejected with reasonable statistical signi…cance.
Although the model therefore seems to …t well, there may still be a large number of cases where it fails to predict individual outcomes correctly. Given that a predicted hiring is de…ned by a predicted probability of being hired exceeding 0:5, we compare this predicted with the actual outcome ("hired" or "not hired") for every applicant. In 96:4% of all cases the predictions are correct (see Table 11 ). For non-hiring cases, this probability even attains 99:82%. However, a hiring decision is correctly predicted in only 6:75% of the respective cases.
Of course, this percentage of correctly predicted hirings can be increased by lowering the cut-o¤ probability de…ning this incidence. The functional relationship between the percentage of correctly predicted recruitments and the cut-o¤ probability is denoted sensitivity. Yet, increasing the cut-o¤ probability comes at the expense of increasing the probability of predicting a hiring when the actual outcome is "not hired". The respective functional relationship between the percentage of falsely predicted recruitments and the cut-o¤ probability is denoted 1-speci…city. Thus, Figure 4 depicts sensitivity as a decreasing and speci…city as an increasing curve of the cut-o¤ probability which de…nes a predicted hiring.
The so-called ROC-curve 27 draws out the sensitivity-speci…city trade-o¤ and provides a benchmark: the predictive power of a model is better the higher the curve arches above the 45-degree line. The ROC-curve would coincide with this line if the model would both correctly and falsely predict 50% of all recruitments for all cut-o¤ probabilities. The area under the ROC-curve is 0:7960 when we include all observations. However, we also calculate this curve using "out-of-sample"-forecasts. Speci…cally, we randomly exclude 10% of the successful applicants and re-estimate the model. Given the newly estimated coe¢cients, we compute the hiring probabilities of the recruits previously excluded. The area under the respective ROC-curve then equals 0:7963. Since this value is not signi…cantly di¤erent at a 5% -level from the one obtained for the full sample, 28 Figure 5 displays the ROC-curve only for this "out-of-sample"-case.
Summary and policy discussion
We analyze a standard employee selection model given two stylized institutional constraints: …rst, professional experience can perfectly substitute for a lack of formal education for insiders while this substitution is imperfect for applications from outside the …rm. Second, due to increased legal risk, the respective "discount rate" applied to professional experience when dealing with outsider applications increases with the advertised minimum educational requirement. The optimal selection policy then implies that the expected level of formal education is higher for outsider than for insider recruits. However, new recruits are only seemingly overquali…ed: in absence of these constraints restricting the signal value of education, the respective standards would be set higher and identically equal for both groups.
Moreover, the legal risk to experience disparate impact charges if educational requirements are increased is higher for low-skilled than for higher-skilled jobs. Hence, the di¤erence in educational attainments between the two groups of recruits increases with lower educational job requirements. The insider-outsider e¤ects are very speci…c to our theoretic approach and are strongly supported by our empirical results. At the same time, these results are also generally consistent with previous empirical work on the overeducation e¤ect on the probability to be hired from the external labor market. Yet, in strong contrast with the career mobility approach as the alternative theoretic framework, underquali…cation actually increases the hiring probability for insider recruits. Finally, our model builds upon qualitative information derived from interviews with the …rm's human resources department. Hence, while unable to directly test the institutional mechanism, we o¤er a novel explanation that is generally supported by our empirical analysis. Groeneveld and Hartog (2004) investigate internal promotions of a large, only recently deregulated European energy and telecommunications company. In contrast, our case concerns employee selection with competing outsider and insider applications by a large US public employer. 29 US …rms enjoy more legal protection of their rights to hire at will. However, the personnel policies of public employers -subjected to constitutional restraints and self-regulated by manuals of "fair" employment practises -appear rather similar to those of large European corporations which face a considerably broader set of legal constraints. 30 Currently, a new set of such regulations is emerging: the Commission of the European Communities (2000) and the Council of Europe (2001) have initiated a process to establish the formal equivalence of educational degrees and professional experience gained in occupational training programs. This policy intends to foster lifelong learning and -mirroring the US disparate impact experience -to include population groups who have been socially excluded from obtaining adequate education.
The EU member states must establish systems of Accreditation of Prior Learning (APEL) by involving all relevant parties -including providers of informal training and non-governmental organizations representing socially excluded groups. 31 The current states of implementation vary widely across the European countries. In France, however, the Validation des Acquis Professionneles (VAP ) and the Validation des Acquis de l'Experience (VAE ) decrees have already achieved that individuals can obtain a perfect university degree equivalent certi…cate without attending university at all. 32 Once put into law such equivalence rules ultimately constitute binding constraints on employee selection processes in all …rms, public and private. Consequently, the rate of substitu-tion between formal education and professional experience should tend to be equalized between insider and outsider applicants -thus, reducing the overquali…cation e¤ect in employee selection processes. However, this development then also diminishes the signal value of formal education. It will therefore further decrease allocative e¢ciency. Variables which concern job speci…cations -Grade = numerical value determined on the basis of six factors and it indicates the payment range of a position title. It increases with job requirements.
-EEO = stands for Equal Employment Opportunity. It has a value of 10 for executive and managerial positions and increases up to 70 for service and maintenance positions.
-FLSA = indicates the Fair Labor Standard Status; it is 1 if employees are exempt (i.e. do not get paid if they do over time work) and 0 if they are not exempt (i.e. they are paid if they work overtime)
-JobType = it is a ranking variable that takes value in between 1 and 6; 1 is the lowest ranked and corresponds to Contingent/On-Call ( 
